publication . Article . 2011

Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism

Quintelier, Katinka; Fessler, Daniel MT;
Open Access
  • Published: 31 May 2011 Journal: Biology & Philosophy, volume 27, pages 95-113 (issn: 0169-3867, eissn: 1572-8404, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
  • Country: Belgium
Abstract
Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of mor...
Subjects
free text keywords: Philosophy and Religion, RELIGIOSITY, PERCEPTION, CHILDREN, ETHICAL IDEOLOGIES, Tolerance, Experimental ethics, RULES, BELIEF, CONVICTION, JUDGMENTS, Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Science, General Agricultural and Biological Sciences, Moral authority, Epistemology, Moral relativism, Moral reasoning, Normative ethics, Relativism, Moral psychology, Social cognitive theory of morality, Moral disengagement
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publication . Article . 2011

Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism

Quintelier, Katinka; Fessler, Daniel MT;