publication . Conference object . 2014

Learning from “Shadow Security”: Why understanding non-compliance provides the basis for effective security

Kirlappos, I.; Parkin, S.; Sasse, M. A.;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Feb 2014
  • Country: United Kingdom
Abstract
Over the past decade, security researchers and practitioners have tried to understand why employees do not comply with organizational security policies and mechanisms. Past re-search has treated compliance as a binary decision: people comply, or they do not. From our analysis of 118 in-depth interviews with individuals (employees in a large multinational organization) about security non-compliance, a 3rd response emerges: shadow security. This describes the instances where security-conscious employees who think they cannot comply with the prescribed security policy create a more fitting alter-native to the policies and mechanisms created by the organization’s of...
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Conference object . 2014
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