publication . Article . 2010

Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

Edmond Baranes; Jean-Christophe Poudou;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Mar 2010
  • Publisher: HAL CCSD
  • Country: France
Abstract
This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that "it is easier to collude among equals", applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion.
Subjects
ACM Computing Classification System: Data_MISCELLANEOUS
free text keywords: [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances, Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Microeconomics, Tacit collusion, Sustainability, Doctrine, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Economics, Industrial organization, Duopoly, Collusion
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