The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk

Book, Conference object, Preprint OPEN
Roland Strausz;
(2010)
  • Publisher: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.18452/4205
  • Subject: regulation, regulatory risk, political economy, independent regulatory agency | 330 Wirtschaft | political economy | L51 | L12 | regulation | independent regulatory agency | regulatory risk | electoral uncertainty | D82 | regulation, regulatory risk, political economy, electoral uncertainty, independent regulatory agency
    • jel: jel:D82
      ddc: ddc:330

The paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist and fully eliminate it ... View more
  • References (58)
    58 references, page 1 of 6

    Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido. 1988. “Credibility and politics,” European Economic Review, 32: 542-550.

    Armstrong, Mark and David E.M. Sappington. 2007. “Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization Vol 3, ed. Mark Armstrong and David E.M. Sappington: 1557-1700. New York: Elsevier.

    Baron, David and Roger Myerson. 1982. “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.” Econometrica, 50: 911-930.

    Chang, Mo-Ahn and Howard Thompson. 1989. “An analysis of some aspects of regulatory risk and the required rate of return for public utilities.” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1(3): 241-257.

    De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. 2002. “Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review, 96(2): 321-333.

    Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2005a. The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors, Swiss Political Science Review, 11(4): 139-167.

    Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2005b. The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598: 84-101.

    Glazer, Amihai. 1989. “Politics and the Choice of Durability” The American Economic Review, 79 (5): 1207-1213

    Kydland, Finn and Edward Prescott. 1977. “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans, Journal of Political Economy, 85: 473-490.

    Laffont, Jean-Jacques. 2000. “Political Economy and Industrial Policy,” Chapter 5 in Incentives and Political Economy (Clarendon Lectures in Economics), Oxford University Press, USA.

  • Metrics