The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk

Book, Research, Conference object English OPEN
Strausz, Roland;
(2009)
  • Publisher: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.18452/4205
  • Subject: 330 Wirtschaft | political economy | L51 | L12 | Aufsichtsbehörde | Public Choice | Selbstverwaltung | regulation | independent regulatory agency | Risiko | Regulierung | Politische Entscheidung | regulatory risk | electoral uncertainty | Theorie | D82
    • ddc: ddc:330

The paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist and fully eliminate it ... View more
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