publication . Preprint . Conference object . Article . Other literature type . 2020

Risk-Limiting Tallies

Jamroga, W.; Roenne, P.; Ryan, P.; Stark, P.;
Open Access English
  • Published: 20 Jul 2020
  • Publisher: Zenodo
Abstract
Many voter-verifiable, coercion-resistant schemes have been proposed, but even the most carefully designed systems necessarily leak information via the announced result. In corner cases, this may be problematic. For example, if all the votes go to one candidate then all vote privacy evaporates. The mere possibility of candidates getting no or few votes could have implications for security in practice: if a coercer demands that a voter cast a vote for such an unpopular candidate, then the voter may feel obliged to obey, even if she is confident that the voting system satisfies the standard coercion resistance definitions. With complex ballots, there may also be a...
Subjects
free text keywords: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, Computer Science - Computers and Society, Statistics - Applications, End-to-end verifiability, Risk-limiting audits, Plausible deniability, Coercion resistance
Funded by
EC| FutureTPM
Project
FutureTPM
Future Proofing the Connected World: A Quantum-Resistant Trusted Platform Module
  • Funder: European Commission (EC)
  • Project Code: 779391
  • Funding stream: H2020 | RIA
Validated by funder
Download fromView all 5 versions
ZENODO
Conference object . 2020
Provider: ZENODO
Zenodo
Other literature type . 2020
Provider: Datacite
27 references, page 1 of 2

1. B. Adida, O. de Marneffe, O. Pereira, and J.-J. Quisquater. Electing a University President using Open-Audit Voting: Analysis of real-world use of Helios. In Proceedings of EVT/WOTE, 2009. [OpenAIRE]

2. B. Adida and C. A. Neff. Ballot casting assurance. In Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, EVT'06, pages 7-7, 2006.

3. D.A. Basin, S. Radomirovic, and L. Schmid. Alethea: A provably secure random sample voting protocol. In 31st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2018, pages 283-297, 2018. [OpenAIRE]

4. J. Benaloh and D. Tuinstra. Receipt-free secret-ballot elections. In Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 544-553. ACM, 1994.

5. J. Benaloh. Simple verifiable elections. In Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, EVT'06, pages 5-5, 2006.

6. S. Canard, D. Pointcheval, Q. Santos, and J. Traor´e. Practical strategy-resistant privacy-preserving elections. In Computer Security, pages 331-349, Cham, 2018. Springer International Publishing. [OpenAIRE]

7. D. Chaum. Random-sample voting. http://rsvoting.org/whitepaper/white_paper.pdf.

8. D. Chaum, P.Y.A. Ryan, and S.A. Schneider. A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme. In Proceedings of ESORICS, LNCS, volume 3679, pages 118-139. Springer-Verlag, 2005. [OpenAIRE]

9. J. Cohen. Improving privacy in cryptographic elections. Technical report, 1986.

10. S. Delaune, S. Kremer, and M. Ryan. Towards trustworthy elections. chapter Verifying Privacy-type Properties of Electronic Voting Protocols: A Taster, pages 289-309. Springer-Verlag, 2010.

11. S.N. Evans and P.B. Stark. Confidence bounds for the mean of a non-negative population, 2019. in prep.

12. A. Juels, D. Catalano, and M. Jakobsson. Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, pages 61-70. ACM, 2005. [OpenAIRE]

13. A. Kiayias, T. Zacharias, and B. Zhang. DEMOS-2: scalable E2E verifiable elections without random oracles. In Proceedings of CCS, pages 352-363, 2015.

14. R. Ku¨sters, T. Truderung, and A. Vogt. A game-based definition of coercionresistance and its applications. In Proceedings of IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), pages 122-136, 2010.

15. M. Lindeman, P.B. Stark, and V. Yates. BRAVO: Ballot-polling risk-limiting audits to verify outcomes. Proceedings of EVT/WOTE '11, 2012.

27 references, page 1 of 2
Abstract
Many voter-verifiable, coercion-resistant schemes have been proposed, but even the most carefully designed systems necessarily leak information via the announced result. In corner cases, this may be problematic. For example, if all the votes go to one candidate then all vote privacy evaporates. The mere possibility of candidates getting no or few votes could have implications for security in practice: if a coercer demands that a voter cast a vote for such an unpopular candidate, then the voter may feel obliged to obey, even if she is confident that the voting system satisfies the standard coercion resistance definitions. With complex ballots, there may also be a...
Subjects
free text keywords: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, Computer Science - Computers and Society, Statistics - Applications, End-to-end verifiability, Risk-limiting audits, Plausible deniability, Coercion resistance
Funded by
EC| FutureTPM
Project
FutureTPM
Future Proofing the Connected World: A Quantum-Resistant Trusted Platform Module
  • Funder: European Commission (EC)
  • Project Code: 779391
  • Funding stream: H2020 | RIA
Validated by funder
Download fromView all 5 versions
ZENODO
Conference object . 2020
Provider: ZENODO
Zenodo
Other literature type . 2020
Provider: Datacite
27 references, page 1 of 2

1. B. Adida, O. de Marneffe, O. Pereira, and J.-J. Quisquater. Electing a University President using Open-Audit Voting: Analysis of real-world use of Helios. In Proceedings of EVT/WOTE, 2009. [OpenAIRE]

2. B. Adida and C. A. Neff. Ballot casting assurance. In Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, EVT'06, pages 7-7, 2006.

3. D.A. Basin, S. Radomirovic, and L. Schmid. Alethea: A provably secure random sample voting protocol. In 31st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2018, pages 283-297, 2018. [OpenAIRE]

4. J. Benaloh and D. Tuinstra. Receipt-free secret-ballot elections. In Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 544-553. ACM, 1994.

5. J. Benaloh. Simple verifiable elections. In Proceedings of the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, EVT'06, pages 5-5, 2006.

6. S. Canard, D. Pointcheval, Q. Santos, and J. Traor´e. Practical strategy-resistant privacy-preserving elections. In Computer Security, pages 331-349, Cham, 2018. Springer International Publishing. [OpenAIRE]

7. D. Chaum. Random-sample voting. http://rsvoting.org/whitepaper/white_paper.pdf.

8. D. Chaum, P.Y.A. Ryan, and S.A. Schneider. A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme. In Proceedings of ESORICS, LNCS, volume 3679, pages 118-139. Springer-Verlag, 2005. [OpenAIRE]

9. J. Cohen. Improving privacy in cryptographic elections. Technical report, 1986.

10. S. Delaune, S. Kremer, and M. Ryan. Towards trustworthy elections. chapter Verifying Privacy-type Properties of Electronic Voting Protocols: A Taster, pages 289-309. Springer-Verlag, 2010.

11. S.N. Evans and P.B. Stark. Confidence bounds for the mean of a non-negative population, 2019. in prep.

12. A. Juels, D. Catalano, and M. Jakobsson. Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, pages 61-70. ACM, 2005. [OpenAIRE]

13. A. Kiayias, T. Zacharias, and B. Zhang. DEMOS-2: scalable E2E verifiable elections without random oracles. In Proceedings of CCS, pages 352-363, 2015.

14. R. Ku¨sters, T. Truderung, and A. Vogt. A game-based definition of coercionresistance and its applications. In Proceedings of IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), pages 122-136, 2010.

15. M. Lindeman, P.B. Stark, and V. Yates. BRAVO: Ballot-polling risk-limiting audits to verify outcomes. Proceedings of EVT/WOTE '11, 2012.

27 references, page 1 of 2
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