publication . Article . 2018

Should fully autonomous artificial intelligence systems be granted legal capacity

Mindaugas Naučius;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Jan 2018
  • Country: Lithuania
The aim of this article is to address the issue of granting legal capacity to artificial inteligence systems. In order to approach the solution to the problem addressed, the article includes several aspects, relevant in order to achieve it. To begin with, the general concept of legal capacity is introduced. Following this aspect, the main features of both natural and juridical persons are addressed, in order to become familiar with the content of legal capacity, or in other words, to be aware – what features do these individuals, which are at present granted legal capacity, possess. Furthermore, the different topic of artificial intelligence is explained, having...
free text keywords: Legal capacity, Artificial intelligence, Fully autonomous, Autonomy, Teisinis subjektiškumas, Dirbtinis intelektas, Autonomija, 34 Teisė / Law
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52 Id.

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54 Supra note 16.

59 Or him. We are not yet aware whether to treat fully autonomous artificial intelligence subject as a thing or as a human being.

53 references, page 1 of 4
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