publication . Doctoral thesis . 2006

Information Aggregation in Organizations

Schulte, Elisabeth;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Jan 2006
  • Publisher: Universität Mannheim
  • Country: Germany
Abstract
This dissertation contributes to the analysis of information aggregation procedures within organizations. Facing uncertainty about the consequences of a collective decision, information has to be aggregated before making a choice. Two main questions are addressed. Firstly, how well is an organization suited for the aggregation of decision-relevant information? Secondly, how should an organization be designed in order to aggregate information efficiently? The main part deals with information aggregation in committees. A committee is a decision-making institution in which several individuals take part in the decision procedure and possibly hold private, decision-r...
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free text keywords: 330 Wirtschaft
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3 Preference Heterogeneity 47 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 3.2 The basic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.2.1 Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 3.2.2 Information processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.2.3 The communication stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.2.4 The voting stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.3 Full information aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 3.4 Extensions to the basic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 3.4.1 Possibility of receiving no signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 3.4.2 Private information concerning preferences . . . . . . . . . 65 3.4.3 Private preferences, possibility of receiving no signal . . . . 74 3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4 Communication in Committees 79 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 4.3 The group debate mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4.4 The open debate mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4.5 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 5.3 Calculation trees with maximum quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 5.4 Efficient organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 14 (h − 1) 12 δ2 [23] Dal Bo, Ernesto (2003): ”Bribing voters”, manuscript, Berkeley University.

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