On the non-contractual nature of donor-recipient interaction in development assistance

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Murshed, S. Mansoob;
  • Publisher: Helsinki: The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
  • Subject: D72 | D82 | F35 | aid | conditionality | contracting | signalling quality | mechanism design | Entwicklungshilfekonditionen | Anreizvertrag | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Moral Hazard | Theorie
    • ddc: ddc:330

This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high powered incentives to the... View more
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