publication . Research . Article . 2017

Using Response Times to Measure Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking in Games

David Gill; Victoria L. Prowse;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Jan 2017
  • Publisher: Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract
Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games (Rubinstein, 2007; Rubinstein, 2016). We leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they face that situation (where we define situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round). We find that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations, and we find considerable heterogeneity in how responsive subjects' thinking times are to complexity. We also study how variation in response times at the individual...
Subjects
free text keywords: C72, C91, response time, decision time, thinking time, strategic complexity, game theory, strategic games, repeated games, beauty contest, cognitive ability, personality, ddc:330, Repeated game, Leverage (finance), Psychology, Nash equilibrium, symbols.namesake, symbols, Social psychology, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Microeconomics, Cognition, Strategic behavior
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publication . Research . Article . 2017

Using Response Times to Measure Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking in Games

David Gill; Victoria L. Prowse;