publication . Article . 2015

Voting over law enforcement: mission impossible

İnal , Hakan;
Open Access
  • Published: 24 Jul 2015 Journal: SERIEs, volume 6, pages 349-360 (issn: 1869-4187, eissn: 1869-4195, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Springer Nature
Median voter theorem has been used in many economic environments including law enforcement. Assumptions of the median voter theorem, however, are generally violated in law enforcement models. Moreover, it is impossible to have agents with “opposite equilibrium preferences” over enforcement levels in law enforcement models. These limitations on the use of preferences over law enforcement raises questions about the robustness and validity of law enforcement models.
free text keywords: D62, D7, K14, K42, Public enforcement, Equilibrium preferences, Enforcement equilibrium, Single-peaked preferences, Single-crossing property, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Voting, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Single peaked preferences, Law enforcement, Median voter theorem, Public finance, Economics, Enforcement, Microeconomics, ddc:330
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