Private information, competition and the renewal of delegation contracts: an econometric analysis of water services in France

Conference object, Research English OPEN
Canneva, Guillem; Garcia, Serge;
  • Publisher: HAL CCSD
  • Subject: common value | modèle de sélection | selection model | VALEUR COMMUNE | contrat | incitation | INCENTIVE CONTRACTS | INFORMATION ASYMETRIQUE | asymmetric information | water utilities | [ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances | [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances | [SDV.SA]Life Sciences [q-bio]/Agricultural sciences | INCENTIVE CONTRACTS;ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;COMMON VALUE;SELECTION MODEL;WATER UTILITIES;INFORMATION ASYMETRIQUE;VALEUR COMMUNE | eau | france | Incentive contract | [ SDV.SA ] Life Sciences [q-bio]/Agricultural sciences | europe

The renewal of franchise bidding for natural monopolies is often considered to be insufficiently competitive. We hypothesize that this may be due to the fact that the incumbent operator knows the existing network better than his competitors. This type of private informa... View more
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