publication . Article . 2017

Parfit's and Scanlon's Non-Metaphysical Moral Realism as Alethic Pluralism

Veluwenkamp, Herman;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Aug 2017
Abstract
Thomas Scanlon and Derek Parfit have recently defended a meta-ethical view that is supposed to satisfy our realistic intuitions about morality, without the metaphysical implications that many find hard to accept in other realist views. Both philosophers argue that truths in the normative domain do not have ontological implications, while truths in the scientific domain presuppose a metaphysical reality. What distinguishes Scanlon and Parfit’s approach from other realistic meta-ethical theories is that they maintain that normative entities exist in a way that is different from (some) non-normative entities. Moreover, they think that the way normative entities exi...
Subjects
free text keywords: Alethic Pluralism, Anti-realism, Mind-dependence, Parfit, Scanlon
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