publication . Article . 2002

russell negative facts and ontology

L. Nathan Oaklander; Silvano Miracchi;
Open Access
  • Published: 25 Nov 2002 Journal: Philosophy of Science, volume 47, pages 434-455 (issn: 0031-8248, eissn: 1539-767X, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Abstract
Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second, that the ontological use of the Ideal Language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis...
Subjects
free text keywords: Intentionality, Philosophy, Epistemology, Doctrine, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Sentence, Ontology, Logical atomism
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