publication . Article . 2017

CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND RISK-TAKING: EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

SunEae Chun; MinHwan Lee;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Dec 2017 Journal: Journal of Governance and Regulation (issn: 2220-9352, eissn: 2306-6784, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Publishing house "Virtus Interpress"
Abstract
<jats:p>We examine the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk-taking in Japan over the sample periods of 2000 2010. Reflecting the ongoing changes in the ownership structure in Japan, we incorporate the various kinds of insider and outsider ownership in the analysis. Ownership such as concentrated ownership, ownership by closely related parties, financial institutions comprising banks and insurance companies and managers are categorized into inside ownership, while ownership by foreigners or financial institution such as investment trusts or pension funds are categorized into outside ownership. The ownership structure is found to have a diff...
Subjects
free text keywords: Corporate Ownership Structure, Risk Taking, Managers’ Incentives, Financial Institution Ownership, Organizational behaviour, change and effectiveness. Corporate culture, HD58.7-58.95, Finance, HG1-9999
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