Paradigms for EU Law and the Limits of Delegation. The Case of EU Agencies

Article English OPEN
Simoncini Marta;
  • Publisher: Sciendo
  • Journal: Perspectives on Federalism (issn: 2036-5438)
  • Publisher copyright policies & self-archiving
  • Identifiers: doi: 10.1515/pof-2017-0009
  • Subject: EU agencies | Political institutions and public administration (General) | supranational delegation | Meroni doctrine | principle of conferral | JF20-2112 | accountability | supranational delegation; principle of conferral; EU agencies; Meroni doctrine; accountability

This article questions the idea that the EU is a pure regulatory power based on supranational delegation of competence from the Member States. It claims the insufficiency of this single paradigm to explain the developments of EU law and the need to integrate it with rec... View more
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