Does Joshua Greene’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?

Article Spanish OPEN
Javier Gracia Calandín;
(2017)
  • Publisher: Universidad Pontificia Comillas
  • Journal: Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica (issn: 0031-4749, eissn: 2386-5822)
  • Publisher copyright policies & self-archiving
  • Identifiers: doi: 10.14422/pen.v72.i273.y2016.003
  • Subject: neuroethics | naturalistic fallacy | dual process theory of moral judgment | Joshua Greene | George Edward Moore. | Philosophy. Psychology. Religion | B | Philosophy (General) | B1-5802

In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more t... View more
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