publication . Conference object . Article . Other literature type . 2017

Biosafety and Biosecurity in European Containment Level 3 Laboratories: Focus on French Recent Progress and Essential Requirements.

Boris Pastorino; Boris Pastorino; Xavier de Lamballerie; Xavier de Lamballerie; Rémi Charrel; Rémi Charrel;
Open Access
  • Published: 31 May 2017 Journal: Frontiers in Public Health (issn: 2296-2565, Copyright policy)
Abstract
Even if European Union (EU) Member States are obliged to implement EU Directives 2000/54/EC on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work, national biosafety regulations and practices varied from country to country. In fact, EU legislation on biological agents and genetically modified microorganisms is often not specific enough to ensure harmonization leading to difficulties in implementation for most laboratories. In the same way, biosecurity is a relatively new concept and a few EU Member States are known to have introduced national laboratory biosecurity legislation. In France, recent regulations have reinforced bios...
Persistent Identifiers
Subjects
free text keywords: biosafety, BSL-3, European union, regulations, infectious disease transmission, vertical, Public Health, containment level 3, France, Review, lcsh:Public aspects of medicine, lcsh:RA1-1270, Risk groups, Member states, Environmental resource management, business.industry, business, Containment, Environmental planning, media_common.cataloged_instance, media_common, Harmonization, Legislation, Biosecurity
Funded by
EC| EVA
Project
EVA
European Virus Archive
  • Funder: European Commission (EC)
  • Project Code: 228292
  • Funding stream: FP7 | SP4 | INFRA
Communities
COVID-19
33 references, page 1 of 3

1 Tierno A. Biosecurity, biosafety and reference laboratories: the impact of national and European regulations concerning biological containment levels 3 and 4. Euro Ref (2012) Special “security and safety”:1–6.

2 Laboratory Biosafety Manual. 3rd. World Health Organization (WHO) (2004).

3 Kozajda A Bródka K Szadkowska-Stańczyk I. Factors influencing biosafety level and LAI among the staff of medical laboratories. Med Pr (2013) 64:473–86.24502112 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed]

4 Wei Q Li X-Y Wang L Lu X-C Jiang M-N Wu G-Z [Preliminary studies on pathogenic microorganisms laboratory-acquired infections cases in recent years and its control strategies]. Chin J Exp Clin Virol (2011) 25:390–2.

5 Wurtz N Papa A Hukic M Di Caro A Leparc-Goffart I Leroy E Survey of laboratory-acquired infections around the world in biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis (2016) 35:1247–58.10.1007/s10096-016-2657-1 27234593 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed] [DOI]

6 Pike RM. Laboratory-associated infections: summary and analysis of 3921 cases. Health Lab Sci (1976) 13:105–14.

7 Byers KB Harding AL. Epidemiology of laboratory-associated infections. In: Fleming DO Hunt DL, editors. Biological Safety Principles and Practices. American Society of Microbiology (2006). p. 53–77.

8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins; biennial review of the list of select agents and toxins and enhanced biosafety requirements. Final rule. Fed Regist (2017) 82:6278–94.28106357 [PubMed]

9 Henkel RD Miller T Weyant RS. Monitoring select agent theft, loss and release reports in the United States – 2004-2010. Appl Biosaf (2012) 17:171–80.10.1177/153567601201700402 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

10 Traxler RM Lehman MW Bosserman EA Guerra MA Smith TL. A literature review of laboratory-acquired brucellosis. J Clin Microbiol (2013) 51:3055–62.10.1128/JCM.00135-13 [DOI]

11 Coelho AC García Díez J. Biological risks and laboratory-acquired infections: a reality that cannot be ignored in health biotechnology. Front Bioeng Biotechnol (2015) 3:56.10.3389/fbioe.2015.00056 25973418 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed] [DOI]

12 Mourya DT Yadav PD Majumdar TD Chauhan DS Katoch VM. Establishment of biosafety level-3 (BSL-3) laboratory: important criteria to consider while designing, constructing, commissioning & operating the facility in Indian setting. Indian J Med Res (2014) 140:171–83.25297350 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed]

13 Tian D Zheng T. Comparison and analysis of biological agent category lists based on biosafety and biodefense. PLoS One (2014) 9:e101163.10.1371/journal.pone.0101163 24979754 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed] [DOI]

14 WHO. Global Action Plan to Minimize Poliovirus Facility-Associated Risk after Type-Specific Eradication of Wild Polioviruses and Sequential Cessation of OPV Use. Geneva: World Health Organization (2014). Available from: http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/Resources/PostEradication/GAPIII_2014.pdf

15 Arita M. Poliovirus studies during the endgame of the polio eradication program. Jpn J Infect Dis (2017) 70:1–6.10.7883/yoken.JJID.2016.356 27795480 [PubMed] [DOI]

33 references, page 1 of 3
Abstract
Even if European Union (EU) Member States are obliged to implement EU Directives 2000/54/EC on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work, national biosafety regulations and practices varied from country to country. In fact, EU legislation on biological agents and genetically modified microorganisms is often not specific enough to ensure harmonization leading to difficulties in implementation for most laboratories. In the same way, biosecurity is a relatively new concept and a few EU Member States are known to have introduced national laboratory biosecurity legislation. In France, recent regulations have reinforced bios...
Persistent Identifiers
Subjects
free text keywords: biosafety, BSL-3, European union, regulations, infectious disease transmission, vertical, Public Health, containment level 3, France, Review, lcsh:Public aspects of medicine, lcsh:RA1-1270, Risk groups, Member states, Environmental resource management, business.industry, business, Containment, Environmental planning, media_common.cataloged_instance, media_common, Harmonization, Legislation, Biosecurity
Funded by
EC| EVA
Project
EVA
European Virus Archive
  • Funder: European Commission (EC)
  • Project Code: 228292
  • Funding stream: FP7 | SP4 | INFRA
Communities
COVID-19
33 references, page 1 of 3

1 Tierno A. Biosecurity, biosafety and reference laboratories: the impact of national and European regulations concerning biological containment levels 3 and 4. Euro Ref (2012) Special “security and safety”:1–6.

2 Laboratory Biosafety Manual. 3rd. World Health Organization (WHO) (2004).

3 Kozajda A Bródka K Szadkowska-Stańczyk I. Factors influencing biosafety level and LAI among the staff of medical laboratories. Med Pr (2013) 64:473–86.24502112 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed]

4 Wei Q Li X-Y Wang L Lu X-C Jiang M-N Wu G-Z [Preliminary studies on pathogenic microorganisms laboratory-acquired infections cases in recent years and its control strategies]. Chin J Exp Clin Virol (2011) 25:390–2.

5 Wurtz N Papa A Hukic M Di Caro A Leparc-Goffart I Leroy E Survey of laboratory-acquired infections around the world in biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis (2016) 35:1247–58.10.1007/s10096-016-2657-1 27234593 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed] [DOI]

6 Pike RM. Laboratory-associated infections: summary and analysis of 3921 cases. Health Lab Sci (1976) 13:105–14.

7 Byers KB Harding AL. Epidemiology of laboratory-associated infections. In: Fleming DO Hunt DL, editors. Biological Safety Principles and Practices. American Society of Microbiology (2006). p. 53–77.

8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins; biennial review of the list of select agents and toxins and enhanced biosafety requirements. Final rule. Fed Regist (2017) 82:6278–94.28106357 [PubMed]

9 Henkel RD Miller T Weyant RS. Monitoring select agent theft, loss and release reports in the United States – 2004-2010. Appl Biosaf (2012) 17:171–80.10.1177/153567601201700402 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

10 Traxler RM Lehman MW Bosserman EA Guerra MA Smith TL. A literature review of laboratory-acquired brucellosis. J Clin Microbiol (2013) 51:3055–62.10.1128/JCM.00135-13 [DOI]

11 Coelho AC García Díez J. Biological risks and laboratory-acquired infections: a reality that cannot be ignored in health biotechnology. Front Bioeng Biotechnol (2015) 3:56.10.3389/fbioe.2015.00056 25973418 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed] [DOI]

12 Mourya DT Yadav PD Majumdar TD Chauhan DS Katoch VM. Establishment of biosafety level-3 (BSL-3) laboratory: important criteria to consider while designing, constructing, commissioning & operating the facility in Indian setting. Indian J Med Res (2014) 140:171–83.25297350 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed]

13 Tian D Zheng T. Comparison and analysis of biological agent category lists based on biosafety and biodefense. PLoS One (2014) 9:e101163.10.1371/journal.pone.0101163 24979754 [OpenAIRE] [PubMed] [DOI]

14 WHO. Global Action Plan to Minimize Poliovirus Facility-Associated Risk after Type-Specific Eradication of Wild Polioviruses and Sequential Cessation of OPV Use. Geneva: World Health Organization (2014). Available from: http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/Resources/PostEradication/GAPIII_2014.pdf

15 Arita M. Poliovirus studies during the endgame of the polio eradication program. Jpn J Infect Dis (2017) 70:1–6.10.7883/yoken.JJID.2016.356 27795480 [PubMed] [DOI]

33 references, page 1 of 3
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