publication . Article . 2014

The cruel and unusual phenomenology of solitary confinement

Shaun eGallagher; Shaun eGallagher; Shaun eGallagher;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Jun 2014 Journal: Frontiers in Psychology, volume 5 (issn: 1664-1078, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Frontiers Media S.A.
Abstract
What happens when subjects are deprived of intersubjective contact? This paper looks closely at the phenomenology and psychology of one example of that deprivation: solitary confinement. It also puts the phenomenology and psychology of solitary confinement to use in the legal context. Not only is there no consensus on whether solitary confinement is a cruel and unusual punishment, there is no consensus on the definition of the term ‘cruel’ in the use of that legal phrase. I argue that we can find a moral consensus on the meaning of ‘cruelty’ by looking specifically at the phenomenology and psychology of solitary confinement.
Subjects
Medical Subject Headings: health care economics and organizationshumanities
free text keywords: Psychology, solitary confinement, cruelty, intersubjectivity, induced autism, self, BF1-990, Hypothesis and Theory Article, General Psychology, Phenomenology (philosophy), Social psychology, Phrase
Related Organizations
Funded by
EC| TESIS
Project
TESIS
Towards an Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity
  • Funder: European Commission (EC)
  • Project Code: 264828
  • Funding stream: FP7 | SP3 | PEOPLE
Communities
Digital Humanities and Cultural Heritage
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