This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaini... View more
1. Buzard, K.; Watson, J. Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment. Theor. Econ. 2012, 7, 283-322.
2. Watson, J. Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade. Manuscript, Department of Economics, UC San Diego: San Diego, CA, USA, 2005. Available online: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/63s1s3j6 (accessed on 1 February 2006).
3. Watson, J. Contract, mechanism design, and technological detail. Econometrica 2007, 75, 55-81.
4. Bull, J.; Watson, J. Evidence disclosure and verifiability. J. Econ. Theory 2004, 118, 1-31.
5. Bull, J.; Watson, J. Hard evidence and mechanism design. Games Econ. Behav. 2007, 58, 75-93.
6. Brennan, J.; Watson, J. The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation. 2002 UCSD Working Paper, Revised 2013.
7. Schwartz, A.; Watson, J. The law and economics of costly contracting. J. Law Econ. Organ. 2004, 20, 2-31.
8. Benoit, J.-P.; Krishna, V. Renegotiation in finitely repeated games. Econometrica 1993, 61, 303-323.
9. Telser, L.G. A theory of self-enforcing agreements. J. Bus. 1980, 53, 27-44.
10. Bull, C., The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. Q. J. Econ. 1987, 102, 147-159.