Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons

Article, Other literature type, Preprint English OPEN
Watson, Joel;
(2006)
  • Publisher: Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
  • Journal: Games,volume 4,issue 3 8,pages1-40 (issn: 2073-4336)
  • Publisher copyright policies & self-archiving
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.3390/g4030457
  • Subject: self-enforcement | bargaining protocols | contractual equilibrium | contract | H | agreements | external enforcement; self-enforcement; negotiation; agreements; contractual equilibrium | external enforcement | Technology | hold up | disagreement points | T | Social Sciences | contract, games, self-enforcement, external enforcement, bargaining protocols, disagreement points, contractual equilibrium, hold up | negotiation | games
    • jel: jel:C70 | jel:C73 | jel:C72 | jel:C71 | jel:C | jel:C7
      ddc: ddc:330

This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaini... View more
  • References (30)
    30 references, page 1 of 3

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