La réputation de l'audit externe et les mécanismes de gouvernement d'entreprise: Interactions et effet sur la performance

Conference object, Preprint French OPEN
Adjaoud, Fodil; Mamoghli, Chokri; Siala, Fatma;
  • Publisher: HAL CCSD
  • Subject: Théorie d'agence,réputation de l'audit externe,conseil d'administration,structure de propriété,interaction des mécanismes de gouvernement d'entreprise,performance | conseil d'administration | [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration | Théorie d'agence | réputation de l'audit externe | performance | structure de propriété | interaction des mécanismes de gouvernement d'entreprise | [ SHS.GESTION ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration

International audience; L'objectif de cette étude est d'analyser l'impact de la combinaison de la réputation de l'audit externe et des mécanismes internes de gouvernement d'entreprise sur la performance. Les tests menés sur un échantillon de 289 entreprises canadiennes ... View more
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