License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

Research, Preprint English OPEN
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.;
  • Publisher: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems München
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.5282/ubm/epub.13353
  • Subject: innovation | D21 | D43 | D45 | D44 | Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems | mechanism design | royalty | A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb | R&D | patents | patents; licensing; auctions; royalty; innovation; R&D; mechanism design | licensing | auctions
    • jel: jel:D44 | jel:D21 | jel:D43 | jel:D45
      ddc: ddc:330
    acm: TheoryofComputation_GENERAL | Data_GENERAL | ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING

This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license... View more
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