Decentralized bribery and market participation

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Popov, Sergey V.;

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decision-making. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft, even though the s... View more
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