Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility.

Research, Preprint OPEN
Eide, Erling (2002)
  • Publisher: Oslo: University of Oslo, Department of Economics
  • Subject: H21 | Nutzen | Tax evasion; optimal taxation; rank dependent expected utility | H26 | Öffentliches Gut | optimal taxation | Optimale Besteuerung | rank dependent expected utility | Erwartungstheorie | D81 | Tax evasion | Steuerflucht | Theorie
    • jel: jel:H21 | jel:D81 | jel:H26
      ddc: ddc:330

In this paper the theory of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) is substituted for the theory of expected utility (EU) in a model of optimal provision of public goods. The substitution generalizes the Samuelson rule, previously modified to include deadweight loss and tax evasion loss.
  • References (2)

    Usher, Dan (1986): Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds, Economic Inquiry, XXIV, 563-86.

    Weber, Elke U. and Britt Kirsner (1997): “Reasons for Rank-Dependent Utility Evaluation”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14, 41-61 Yaari, M. E. (1987): The Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk. Econometrica, 63, 95-115.

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