Controlling Banker's Bonuses: Efficient Regulation or Politics of Envy?

Research, Preprint OPEN
Matthews, Kent; Matthews, Owen;
  • Publisher: Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School Cardiff
  • Subject: risk taking | Führungskräfte | Welt | G21 | banker’s bonus | G28 | Finanzmarktkrise | Bank | Anreizvertrag | Bankenaufsicht | macro-prudential regulation | Banker's bonus;risk taking;Too-big-to-Fail;macro-prudential regulation | too-big-to-fail
    • jel: jel:G21 | jel:G28
      ddc: ddc:330

The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in the hope that the ... View more
  • References (1)

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