publication . Article . Preprint . 2018

Quantum man-in-the-middle attack on the calibration process of quantum key distribution

Yang-Yang Fei; Xiang-Dong Meng; Ming Gao; Hong Wang; Zhi Ma;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Mar 2018 Journal: Scientific Reports, volume 8 (issn: 2045-2322, eissn: 2045-2322, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Nature Publishing Group UK
Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has been proved to provide unconditionally secure key between two remote legitimate users in theory. Key distribution signals are transmitted in a quantum channel which is established by the calibration process to meet the requirement of high count rate and low error rate. All QKD security proofs implicitly assume that the quantum channel has been established securely. However, the eavesdropper may attack the calibration process to break the security assumption of QKD and provide precondition to steal information about the final key successfully. Inspired by N. Jain et al., Phys. Rev. Lett.107,110501(2011), we reveal the s...
Subjects
arxiv: Computer Science::Cryptography and Security
free text keywords: Q, R, Science, Medicine, Article, Quantum Physics
Related Organizations
49 references, page 1 of 4

Gisin, N, Ribordy, G, Tittel, W, Zbinden, H. Quantum cryptography. Reviews of modern physics. 2002; 74: 145 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Lütkenhaus, N, Shields, A. Focus on quantum cryptography: theory and practice. New Journal of Physics. 2009; 11: 045005 [DOI]

Scarani, V. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Reviews of modern physics. 2009; 81: 1301 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Huttner, B, Imoto, N, Gisin, N, Mor, T. Quantum cryptography with coherent states. Physical Review A. 1995; 51: 1863 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Liu, W-T, Sun, S-H, Liang, L-M, Yuan, J-M. Proof-of-principle experiment of a modified photon-number-splitting attack against quantum key distribution. Physical Review A. 2011; 83: 042326 [DOI]

Gisin, N, Fasel, S, Kraus, B, Zbinden, H, Ribordy, G. Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems. Physical Review A. 2006; 73: 022320 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Jain, N. Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography. New Journal of Physics. 2014; 16: 123030 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Fung, C-HF, Qi, B, Tamaki, K, Lo, H-K. Phase-remapping attack in practical quantum-key-distribution systems. Physical Review A. 2007; 75: 032314 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Xu, F, Qi, B, Lo, H-K. Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system. New Journal of Physics. 2010; 12: 113026 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Sun, S-H, Gao, M, Jiang, M-S, Li, C-Y, Liang, L-M. Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system. Physical Review A. 2012; 85: 032304 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Tang, Y-L. Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information. Physical Review A. 2013; 88: 022308 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

12.Sun, S.-H., Jiang, M.-S., Ma, X.-C., Li, C.-Y. & Liang, L.-M. Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization. Scientific reports 4 (2014).

Makarov, V, Hjelme, DR. Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems. Journal of Modern Optics. 2005; 52: 691-705 [DOI]

Makarov, V, Anisimov, A, Skaar, J. Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems. Physical Review A. 2006; 74: 022313 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Makarov, V, Skaar, J. Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols. Quantum Information & Computation. 2008; 8: 622-635

49 references, page 1 of 4
Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has been proved to provide unconditionally secure key between two remote legitimate users in theory. Key distribution signals are transmitted in a quantum channel which is established by the calibration process to meet the requirement of high count rate and low error rate. All QKD security proofs implicitly assume that the quantum channel has been established securely. However, the eavesdropper may attack the calibration process to break the security assumption of QKD and provide precondition to steal information about the final key successfully. Inspired by N. Jain et al., Phys. Rev. Lett.107,110501(2011), we reveal the s...
Subjects
arxiv: Computer Science::Cryptography and Security
free text keywords: Q, R, Science, Medicine, Article, Quantum Physics
Related Organizations
49 references, page 1 of 4

Gisin, N, Ribordy, G, Tittel, W, Zbinden, H. Quantum cryptography. Reviews of modern physics. 2002; 74: 145 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Lütkenhaus, N, Shields, A. Focus on quantum cryptography: theory and practice. New Journal of Physics. 2009; 11: 045005 [DOI]

Scarani, V. The security of practical quantum key distribution. Reviews of modern physics. 2009; 81: 1301 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Huttner, B, Imoto, N, Gisin, N, Mor, T. Quantum cryptography with coherent states. Physical Review A. 1995; 51: 1863 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Liu, W-T, Sun, S-H, Liang, L-M, Yuan, J-M. Proof-of-principle experiment of a modified photon-number-splitting attack against quantum key distribution. Physical Review A. 2011; 83: 042326 [DOI]

Gisin, N, Fasel, S, Kraus, B, Zbinden, H, Ribordy, G. Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems. Physical Review A. 2006; 73: 022320 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Jain, N. Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography. New Journal of Physics. 2014; 16: 123030 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Fung, C-HF, Qi, B, Tamaki, K, Lo, H-K. Phase-remapping attack in practical quantum-key-distribution systems. Physical Review A. 2007; 75: 032314 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Xu, F, Qi, B, Lo, H-K. Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system. New Journal of Physics. 2010; 12: 113026 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Sun, S-H, Gao, M, Jiang, M-S, Li, C-Y, Liang, L-M. Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system. Physical Review A. 2012; 85: 032304 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Tang, Y-L. Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information. Physical Review A. 2013; 88: 022308 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

12.Sun, S.-H., Jiang, M.-S., Ma, X.-C., Li, C.-Y. & Liang, L.-M. Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization. Scientific reports 4 (2014).

Makarov, V, Hjelme, DR. Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems. Journal of Modern Optics. 2005; 52: 691-705 [DOI]

Makarov, V, Anisimov, A, Skaar, J. Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems. Physical Review A. 2006; 74: 022313 [OpenAIRE] [DOI]

Makarov, V, Skaar, J. Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols. Quantum Information & Computation. 2008; 8: 622-635

49 references, page 1 of 4
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publication . Article . Preprint . 2018

Quantum man-in-the-middle attack on the calibration process of quantum key distribution

Yang-Yang Fei; Xiang-Dong Meng; Ming Gao; Hong Wang; Zhi Ma;