Subject: Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
arxiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has been demonstrated only for th... View more
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