Honest signaling in trust interactions: smiles rated as genuine induce trust and signal higher earning opportunities

Article English OPEN
Centorrino, Samuele; Djemaï, Elodie; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Milinski, Manfred; Seabright, Paul;
  • Publisher: Elsevier BV
  • Journal: volume 36, issue 1, pages 8-16issn: 1090-5138
  • Publisher copyright policies & self-archiving
  • Identifiers: doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.08.001
  • Subject: Honest signaling | smiling | [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin] | experiment | JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior | trust game | JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D70 - General | Experimental and Cognitive Psychology | Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics | video | JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative Games

International audience; We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around... View more
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