Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the "myths".

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Jefferson, C.; Lentzos, F.; Marris, C.;

Synthetic biology, a field that aims to “make biology easier to engineer,” is routinely described as leading to an increase in the “dual-use” threat, i.e., the potential for the same scientific research to be “used” for peaceful purposes or “misused” for warfare or terr... View more
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