arxiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non- policy advantage over the other candidate. We ... View more
1 See, e.g., Stokes (1963), Kiewiet (1983), and Kiewiet and Zheng (1993).
38: 170-74. Groseclose, Timothy 2001. A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage. American Journal of Political Science 45 (October): 862-86. Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Langche Zeng. 1993. “An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions, 1947-86”. American Political Science Review 87: 928-41 Kirstein, Roland and Georg v. Wagenheim. 2010. A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem with Two Independent Probabilities of Error. MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics. Londregan, John and Thomas Romer. 1993. Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote.
Hinich, and N.J. Schofield eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 355-77. Sion, M. and P. Wolfe. 1957. On a Game Without a Value. Contributions to the Theory of Games, III. (Princeton: Annals of Mathematical Studies No. 39), 299-306. Stokes, Donald E. 1963. Spatial Models of Party Competition. American Political Science Review.