Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships

Research, Article, Preprint OPEN
Lachlan Deer; Ralph-C. Bayer;

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissol... View more
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