Make-or-buy decisions and the manipulability of performance measures

Research, Preprint English OPEN
Andersson, Fredrik;
(2009)
  • Publisher: Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy
  • Subject: D23 | Verhalten in Organisationen | make-or-buy decision | L22 | L24 | Economics | outsourcing | make-or-buy decision; manipulation; outsourcing | Make or Buy | Nationalekonomi | manipulation | Theorie
    • jel: jel:D23 | jel:L22 | jel:L24
      ddc: ddc:330

Abstract in Undetermined The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple framework combining contractual incompleteness with the existence of an imperfect but contractible performance measure. Contractual incompleteness gives rise to two regimes, identified with make a... View more
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