Nuclear Arms Race and Environment

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Li, Anpeng (2012)
  • Subject: H56 - National Security and War | nuclear arms race, environment, prisoner's dilemma, endogenous Richardson model
    • jel: jel:H56

This paper introduces a new factor, environment, into nuclear arms race model. In this model, nuclear weapons produce larger defense power compared with conventional arms, but hurt the environment meanwhile. In the global welfare maximum level, both conventional and nuclear weapons budget are zero. However, the competitive equilibrium may not achieve the optimum. I give the condition to jump out of the prisoner's dilemma.
  • References (14)
    14 references, page 1 of 2

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