Das Design der internationalen Institutionen zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung
Rixen, Thomas;
- Publisher: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Berlin
- Subject: Neue Institutionenökonomik | Doppelbesteuerung | Spieltheorie | Verhandlungen | Steuerwettbewerb | Theorie
- ddc: ddc:300
This article analyzes the institutional design of international double tax avoidance. The basic argument is that double tax avoidance exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game with a distributive conflict. The distribution of tax revenues depends on the as... View more
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