Performance measurement, expectancy and agency theory: An experimental study

Article, Research, Report, Preprint English OPEN
Sloof, Randolph; van Praag, Mirjam;
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.003
  • Subject: Leistungsanreiz | expectancy theory | experiments | Leistungsbeurteilung | J33 | Methods and Techniques of Data Collection and Data Analysis, Statistical Methods, Computer Methods | Social Sciences & Humanities | Agency Theory | Performance measurement; Expectancy theory; Real effort experiments; Agency theory; Personnel economics | D81 | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie | real effort experiments | Expectancy theory; agency theory; performance measurement; experiments | Leistungskontrolle | class eco B | Performance measurement | personnel economics | Erhebungstechniken und Analysetechniken der Sozialwissenschaften | C91 | Social sciences, sociology, anthropology
    • jel: jel:D81 | jel:J33 | jel:C91
      ddc: ddc:330 | ddc:300

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. An important implication of this model is that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent's optimal effort choice is unrelated to the amount of n... View more
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