publication . Research . 2004

Delegated bargaining and competition

Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Roth, Stefan;
Open Access English
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a two-producers two-agent model in which producers delegate sales and price negotiations to exclusive, separate, and independent agents. Producers first choose a pricing arrangement (two-part tariff versus linear tariff) and then set wholesale prices (and fixed fees)to their agents. Given this, agents announce prices to consumers as a basis for negotiations. Finally, consumers make their buying decision and bargain about the actually paid price once they arrive at an agent`s location. We show that both franchise pricing and linear pricing can be supported as equilibrium outcomes depending on the agents` fixed costs and consumers` bargai...
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publication . Research . 2004

Delegated bargaining and competition

Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Roth, Stefan;