Boards : Independent and committed directors?

Article, Preprint English OPEN
Volonté, Christophe;
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • Identifiers: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.10.002
  • Subject: Board of directors; Board independence; Board busyness; External commitments [Corporate governance] | Corporate governance; Board of directors; Board independence; Outside activities
    • jel: jel:G30 | jel:G30; G34; K22 | jel:G34 | jel:K22
      ddc: ddc:330

Regulators, proxy advisors and shareholders are regularly calling for independent directors. However, at the same time, independent directors commonly engage in numerous outside activities potentially reducing their time and commitment with the particular firm. Using To... View more
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