Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation

Research, Preprint OPEN
Beyer, Mila; Czarnitzki, Dirk; Kraft, Kornelius;
  • Publisher: Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Mannheim
  • Subject: innovation | R&D investments | 330 Wirtschaft | G32 | O31 | managerial ownership | corporate governance,managerial ownership,entrenchment,innovation,R&D investments | O32 | entrenchment | corporate governance
    • jel: jel:G32 | jel:O32 | jel:O31
      ddc: ddc:330

Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and... View more
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