Coalitional negotiation

Preprint, Research English OPEN
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent;
  • Subject: coalition formation, inspections, positive spillovers, largest consistent set. | Largest consistent set | Positive spillovers | Inspections | Coalition formation
    • jel: jel:C78 | jel:C70 | jel:C72 | jel:C71

We develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs. In the first stage, the players are forming coalitions and inside each coalition formed the members share the coalition... View more
  • References (23)
    23 references, page 1 of 3

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