Management compensation, monitoring and aggressive corporate tax planning

Research, Preprint English OPEN
Steinhoff, Melanie;
  • Publisher: CAWM Münster
  • Subject: corporate tax planning | D21 | H25 | management incentives,hidden action,corporate tax planning | management incentives, hidden action, corporate tax planning | management incentives | hidden action | D82
    • jel: jel:D21 | jel:D82 | jel:H25
      ddc: ddc:330
    acm: ComputingMilieux_GENERAL | ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING

The empirical literature shows that management incentives often reduce corporate tax aggressiveness. Focussing on the riskiness of tax aggressiveness this paper offers one explanation for the observed negative relation. Using an agency framework, I analyze the manager's... View more
  • References (22)
    22 references, page 1 of 3

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