Pensions with Heterogenous Individuals and Endogenous Fertility

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CREMER, Helmuth; GAHVARI, Firouz; PESTIEAU, Pierre;
  • Publisher: IDEI Working Paper
  • Subject: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE | adverse selection; fertility; pensions
    • jel: jel:H55 | jel:J13 | jel:J26

This paper studies the design of pension schemes in a society where fertility is endogenous and parents differ in their ability to raise children. In a world with perfect information, a pay-as-you-go social security system is characterized by equal pensions for all but ... View more
  • References (8)

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