Voting over law enforcement: mission impossible

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İnal , Hakan;

Median voter theorem has been used in many economic environments including law enforcement. Assumptions of the median voter theorem, however, are generally violated in lawenforcement models. Moreover, it is impossible to have agents with "opposite equilibrium preference... View more
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