Publisher: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munich
Is investment constrained more by insecure property rights or by limited external finance? For five transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we find that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in startup ma nufacturing firms. Ac... View more
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