Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

Article, Research, Preprint English OPEN
Enriqueta Aragonès; Dimitrios Xefteris;
(2013)
  • Publisher: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.1111/iere.12223, handle: 10261/167695
  • Subject: 33 - Economia | Imperfect information | Downsian model; imperfect information; advantaged candidate; maximum differentiation | Downsian model | Vot -- Models matemàtics | Downsian model, imperfect information, advantaged candidate, maximum differentiation | Advantaged candidate | Maximum differentiation
    • jel: jel:D72

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the mos... View more
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