This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in <I>Economics Letters</I>, 114, 39-42.<P> Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a ... View more
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