Subject: Partnership formation; adjustment process; equilibrium; assignment market | C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium | partnership information | adjustment process | D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations | C72 - Noncooperative Games | Partnership formation | Partnership formation;adjustment process;equilibrium;assignment market | Partnership formation, adjustment process, equilibrium, assignment market | assignment market | equilibrium
jel: jel:D02 | jel:C62 | jel:C72
A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not ... View more
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