A Theory of Tax Avoidance - Managerial Incentives for Tax Planning in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Research, Preprint English OPEN
Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer;
(2014)
  • Publisher: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) Munich
  • Subject: principal-agent theory | H25 | H24 | M41 | tax avoidance, principal-agent theory, tax planning, multi-task models, corporate governance | tax avoidance | multi-task models | corporate governance | tax planning
    • ddc: ddc:330
      jel: jel:H25 | jel:H24 | jel:M41

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model show... View more
  • References (1)

    Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (2013b)  OECD  Tax  Database  -   Basic   (non-­‐targeted)   corporate   income   tax   rates.   http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-­‐ policy/Table%20II.1_May%202013.xlsx.  Accessed  20  May  2013  

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