Contribution Games and the End-Game Effect: When Things Get Real – An Experimental Analysis

Research, Preprint OPEN
Bar-El, Ronen ; Tobol, Yossi (2013)
  • Publisher: Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
  • Subject: H41 | free-riding | public goods experiment | end-game effect | end-game effect, public goods experiment, free-riding | C92 | C72
    • jel: jel:H41 | jel:C92 | jel:C72
      ddc: ddc:330

We conduct a contribution game for a real public good and show that when the contributors value the real public good highly, they increase their contributions in each round. Thus, contrary to previous literature, free riding decreases over rounds and the end-game effect... View more
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