Arms Races and Negotiations

Article, Preprint OPEN
Sandeep Baliga; Tomas Sjostrom;
(2003)
  • Journal: The Review of Economic Studies,volume 71,issue 2,pages351-369
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.1111/0034-6527.00287
  • Subject: Multiplier Effect, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Cheap-talk Extension, Arms Race Game

Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, t... View more
  • References (2)

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