Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment

Research, Preprint OPEN
Grout, Paul ; Schnedler, Wendelin (2008)
  • Publisher: Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
  • Subject: power within organizations | L30 | J32 | H11 | M52 | Spende | B├╝rokratie | Fundraising | Arbeitsangebot | donated labor, intrinsic motivation, non-profit organizations, power within organizations | Nonprofit-Organisation | 330 Wirtschaft | H42 | non-profit organizations | donated labor | intrinsic motivation | Ehrenamtliche Arbeit | Soziales Verhalten | Theorie
    • jel: jel:H40 | jel:H42 | jel:M52 | jel:L30 | jel:J32 | jel:M50 | jel:H11 | jel:H10
      ddc: ddc:330

How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.
  • References (10)

    Hansmann, Henry B., \The Role of Nonpro t Enterprise," Yale Law Journal, 1980, 89, 839{901.

    Hilborn, Robert C., \Sea Gulls, Butter ies, and Grasshoppers: A Brief History of the Butter y E ect in Nonlinear Dynamics," American Journal of Physics, 2004, 72 (11), 425{427.

    Holmstrom, Bengt, \Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10 (1), 74{91.

    , \Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13 (2), 324{ 340.

    , \Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66, 169{182.

    and Paul Milgrom, \Multitask Principal-Agent-Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991, 7, 24{52. special issue.

    Ratto, Marisa and Wendelin Schnedler, \Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth: Division of Labour and Directed Production," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2008, 8 (1, Topics), Article 27.

    Schnedler, Wendelin, \When is It Foolish to Reward for A While Beneting from B?," Journal of Labor Economics, 2008, 26 (4), 595{619.

    Shavell, Steven, \Risk-Sharing and Incentives in the Principal-Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10 (1), 55{73.

    Sliwka, Dirk, \On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, 2007, 97 (3), 999{1012.

  • Similar Research Results (1)
  • Metrics
    No metrics available
Share - Bookmark