Collusion and the elasticity of demand

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David Collie;
  • Journal: Economics Bulletin,volume 12,issue 3,pages1-6
  • Subject: cartel
    • jel: jel:L1 | jel:C7

The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly games has generally assumed that demand is linear, but this note uses constant-elasticity demand functions to investigate how the elasticity of demand affects the sustainability of collusion.
  • References (6)

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    Jacquemin, Alexis and Margaret E. Slade, 1989. Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Wilig (editors), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol 1, North-Holland, Amsterdam.

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